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Abstract: 
Scholars predicted that official Russian commemorations of the centenary of the 1917 
revolutions would prioritise ‘reconciliation and accord’ between pro- and anti-
communists. Such a frame might help construct a new post-Soviet Russian identity. Yet, 
in 2017, state-affiliated political and media actors gave accounts that contrasted with their 
previous narratives and with each other. Domestic state-aligned media were 
unprecedentedly negative about the revolutions’ events and enduring legacies; whilst 
Russia’s international broadcaster, RT, emphasised the revolution's positive international 
legacies. We explain this paradox by arguing that regimes of commemoration are directly 
related to political systems: in neo-authoritarian regimes such as contemporary Russia, 
history is not used primarily for nation-building, but to build legitimacy for the ruling 
regime. Referencing similar practices in other neo-authoritarian regimes, we show how 
state-affiliated actors selectively co-opt interpretations of historical events that circulate 
in the global media ecology, to ‘arrest’ the ‘memory of the multitude’. Simultaneously, 
they reinforce core messages that legitimise the existing government. 
 
The 1917 February and October revolutions in Russia retain their reputation worldwide 
as defining historical events: the destruction of the Tsarist Empire brought the Bolsheviks 
to power in the world’s first communist state and helped set the geopolitical dividing 
lines of the twentieth century. Yet, a hundred years later, and twenty six years since the 
resulting communist state collapsed, Russia had no coherent, new historical narrative 
about the events of 1917 – a significant omission for a state whose post-Soviet identity 
crisis has been well-documented (Malinova, 2015; Torbakov, 2011). Experienced 
scholars of Russia anticipated that official narratives would foreground reconciliation and 
accord between the pro- and anti-communists, sidelining Soviet terror and prioritising the 
Soviet Union's military and scientific achievements (Malinova, 2018; Torbakov, 2018; 
Edele, 2017; Fitzpatrick, 2017; Rendle and Lively, 2017). However, actors articulating 
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the official position ultimately produced an unprecedented and wholesale rejection of the 
Bolshevik project and, crucially, of its enduring legacies.  
Scholars’ predictions were based on early statements that President Vladimir Putin and 
Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky made about the revolutions. However, it is not 
solely politicians that produce Russian official discourse – which we define as the widely 
circulating communications that performatively construct, rather than merely reflect, 
social realities (van Dijk, 1996). Russian state-aligned broadcasters – funded by the 
government, and editorially-aligned with its priorities - play a crucial role in the process. 
Indeed, Russia’s political elites appear acutely aware that contemporary media penetrate 
and fuse with all elements of daily life, rather than merely ‘mediating’ events external to 
them. This process, known as ‘mediatization’, combines with rapid transnational 
information flows, making it impossible to systematically control information from 
above. Instead, neo-authoritarian political and media elites together operate to limit the 
accessibility, rather than availability, of information (Hoskins and Shchelin 2018). They 
aim to ensure that the ‘old’ and ‘new’ media accessible to their citizens are dominated by 
narratives (interconnected stories) and frames (characterizations of those stories’ core 
elements and how they fit together) that reinforce government-preferred messages. 
However, contemporary information flows are inherently multidirectional, and so, too, 
are the processes of narrative articulation and framing (Bernstein, 2016: 430-3). Thus, 
whilst state-aligned broadcasters remain the primary news source in many neo-
authoritarian states (Becker 2013), Russian state-aligned media, executives and 
journalists are allotted significant leeway to co-produce, not just disseminate, official 
discourse (Tolz and Teper 2018). This is why a December 2016 Russian Presidential 
decree assigned representatives of three state-funded broadcasters, Channel 1, Rossiya-1 
and RT, to the Organisation Committee for the Preparation of the Commemoration of the 
Revolution (President of Russia, 2016).  
It might have made political sense for Putin and Medinsky to mark this centenary with 
narratives of reconciliation and accord. This could simultaneously appeal to the 
revolution-sympathetic lobby (the Communist Party and military) and revolution-critical 
groups (Orthodox Church and overseas diaspora) – both of which Russia’s political 
leadership relies upon to maintain its legitimacy. President Boris Yeltsin had used this 
reconciliation frame during the 80th anniversary of the revolution after divisive elections 
(Malinova 2018). Its non-committal nature could navigate an awkward centenary which 
could not have been ignored, but whose revolutionary connotations are viewed extremely 
negatively by the Kremlin. 
Yet, by October-November 2017, ‘reconciliation and accord’ became marginal within 
official discourse. Putin made scathing comments about the Bolsheviks and their 
legacies, whilst on domestic television, Channel 1 and Rossiya-1 portrayed both 1917 
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revolutions as treasonous criminal coups. By contrast, Russia’s international broadcaster, 
RT, invited foreign audiences to co-produce narratives via social media, which turned out 
to be more complex. How can we explain these key actors re-writing the October 
revolution and its Soviet legacy in stark contrast to previous narratives, and tailored for 
different audiences? What does it tell us about commemoration and uses of the past 
within Russia's neo-authoritarian system?  
Sources, methods and conceptual framework 
To address these questions, we drew on empirical sources taken from the outputs of the 
three broadcasters represented on the centenary’s official Organisation Committee: 
Russia’s two main domestic state-aligned channels, Channel 1, and Rossiya-1, which 
remain the main source of information for the majority of Russian citizens1; and its 
international broadcaster, RT. These channels commemorated the revolution using online 
and social media, in addition to ‘traditional’ broadcasting. This demonstrates an 
appreciation of the nature of the contemporary media ecology – the ‘specific balanced 
environment’ within which media technologies function like ‘organic life forms,’ as ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ media interact and compete in complex ways (Hoskins and Shchelin 2018: 3). 
Rather than systematically censoring undesirable online and social media flows in the 
Russian media ecology, the Russian political leadership adopts various strategies to 
ensure preferred narratives and frames dominate (Hoskins and Shchelin 2018). Television 
retains a crucial role in ensuring their predominance, despite rising audience mistrust 
(Szostek 2018), and our analysis shows how the dynamics of this specific media ecology 
shaped coverage of the revolution’s centenary.  
We collected our empirical sources by identifying five key episodes in the 1917 
revolutionary developments likely to spark significant media coverage. We created a 
database of relevant programmes broadcast in these periods, and found that only two 
attracted coverage of any substance.2 Additionally, the research team of the ‘Reframing 
Russia’ project3 scraped the outputs of the central account in RT’s #1917LIVE Twitter 
project (@RT_1917) and its associated hashtags (#1917LIVE; #1917CROWD) 
throughout 2017. Our analysis of how state-aligned broadcasters navigated the 
commemoration of the revolutions was focused around the narratives that were 
disseminated and the techniques used for reaching audiences across their broadcast, 
online and social media outputs. This helped us to gain insight into the broader goals that 
such representations of the past were intended to achieve. Whilst our analysis addresses 
the contributions of audiences as co-producers of narrative, a comprehensive analysis of 
the audience reception of 1917LIVE, can be found in Crilley, Gillespie and Willis (this 
issue).  
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The subjects of scholarly studies of the politics of commemoration are wide-ranging, 
from the ‘hardware’ of fixed stone commemorative artefacts to the deterritorialized 
‘software’ of historical, cultural and other products, and events unfolding within 
particular communities over time (Blacker and Etkind, 2013: 5-6). The emphasis is not 
on how individuals perceive and communicate events they have directly experienced, but 
on how narratives are produced, circulated and made intransient (Fedor et al, 2017: 3). 
National memory, then, is the frame within which citizens can ‘place events in the 
national history, whether or not [they] took part in them’ (Snyder 2002: 39). In this 
regard, historical commemorations function as ‘a form of memory materalization’ to 
convert ‘past social occurrences (particularly those not directly experienced) into objects 
relevant to contemporary social realities’ (Zadora, 2017: 179). As we will see, the 
predominance of contemporary issues was particularly striking in our case, and we 
suggest that broadcasters were not primarily concerned with forging particular 
understandings of Russian history among their audiences. Our analysis is not, therefore, 
focused on the social phenomenon of community-centred collective memory initiatives 
that provide frames for members of a community to make sense of the past. Rather, we 
refer to what Miller and Lipman (2012) call the politics of history - state-aligned actors’ 
uses of history for political purposes.  
Our analysis aims to transcend common methodological and conceptual limitations in 
studies of politics of history and commemoration in Russia and post-communist Europe. 
The first is the tendency of such studies to treat media as a source of factual information, 
rather than as a focus of analysis (Ryan, 2018; Malinova 2015; Miller and Lipman, 
2012). In turn, works on the mediation of the past in this context tend to study one 
selected medium, e.g. cinema, television or social media (Kalinina, 2017; Laruelle, 2014; 
Rutten, Fedor and Zvereva, 2013). Yet, the conversion of individual understandings of 
history into something of relevance across space and time demands the continuous 
mediation of particular symbolic artefacts, which is a dynamic process that takes place 
within a wider media ecology (Erll and Rigney 2009:1). In combining insights from our 
respective home disciplines of international relations, and history, we are able to shed 
light on just how fundamentally the rapidity and transnationality of the present media 
ecology influences this conversion process. Most importantly, whilst the circulation of 
narratives through multiple media platforms can present challenges for state-affiliated 
actors, it also offers new opportunities to legitimise the ruling regime. Thus, if post-
Soviet commemorations of historical events have developed ‘beyond the usual ways of 
instrumentalising the past’ (Fedor et al., 2017: 8), this article interrogates some specific 
developments that the commemoration of the revolutions’ centenary in Russia highlights.  
The second problem is methodological, in that studies of the politics of commemoration 
within Russia and Eastern Europe are overwhelmingly nation-specific (Mihelj, 2017), or 
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confined to the post-socialist space (Etkind et al, 2012; Rutten and Zvereva, 2013; Miller 
and Lipman, 2012; EJCS, 2017).4 It has been suggested to further transnationalise the 
discussion by acknowledging the circulation of ideas and images between Eastern and 
Western Europe (Mihelj, 2017). However, we contend that Russia’s status as a neo-
authoritarian regime – i.e. a political system in which autocratic and (pseudo-)democratic 
rules and practices are combined (Petrov et al. 2014) - is crucial for understanding the 
strategies that state-affiliated political and media actors adopt in articulating and 
disseminating narratives about historical events. Therefore, we refer to comparisons with 
neo-authoritarian states globally, such as in East Asia and Latin America. Political 
regimes derive their legitimacy from the extent to which they appear to operate according 
to rules justified by widely-accepted beliefs: subordinate groups ultimately consent to 
these power relations (Beetham, 1991: 16). As mass media play a crucial role in shaping 
such beliefs and values, neo-authoritarian regimes attempt to control influential media, 
and manipulate the wider media ecology in order to 'reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy 
without running the risks of democratic uncertainty' (Schedler, 2002: 36; see also Walker 
and Orttung, 2014). Consequently, Russia’s commemorative practices likely bear more 
similarities to those in comparable neo-authoritarian regimes, where incumbent political 
elites’ primacy over information is challenged by the circulation patterns of an inherently 
global media ecology.  
In addressing these two problems, we become freed from a third, crucial, limitation of 
existing work on post-Soviet memory: the default assumption that state-endorsed public 
commemoration projects are nation-building initiatives (e.g. Malinova, 2018; Kalinina, 
2017: 286; Hutchings and Szostek, 2015; Malinova, 2015). In fact, whilst state-sponsored 
commemorative initiatives often reflect elites' nation-building objectives, they do not 
have to do so. The manipulation of national memory tends to be part of a regime's broad 
legitimation strategy (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), which may or may not involve 
nation-building. In fact, a 'deep national identity may not be necessary or desirable in a 
patrimonial, authoritarian system,' because it can 'empower rival political actors who 
could challenge the authority of the leader.' In many such states, then, 'we are not seeing 
nation-building, so much as identity management and regime maintenance' (Rutland and 
Taras, forthcoming).  
The idiosyncratic mediation of the revolution’s centenary belies claims that Russia’s 
political leadership is using history to achieve the 'consolidation of nation-building' 
(Malinova, 2018: 272 and 275). Instead, specific narratives are articulated by ruling 
political elites and state-aligned media in order to influence citizens' values and beliefs in 
ways that legitimise the existing government under Putin. Decoupling nation-building 
and the regime's broader legitimation strategy helps to explain sharp fluctuations in 
official historical narratives under the same political leadership, and marked divergences 
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between the narratives disseminated by state-funded media to different audiences. Such 
inconsistencies would be problematic for any long-term nation-building project, but are 
advantageous for the regime’s responsive strategy of legitimatory ideological messaging. 
The first substantive section of this article discusses how, since the controversial 
elections of 2011 and 2012, the Putin leadership has flexibly fused together ideas, norms 
and identity discourse to suit the leadership’s legitimatory imperatives at any given time. 
The second section interrogates the narrative competition surrounding the legacies of the 
1917 revolutions amongst domestically influential groups, and in the international arena. 
It examines how these were represented and performed in media coverage of the 
revolution. The final section demonstrates that though domestic coverage undermined the 
nation-building potential of the shared Soviet experience, it served the regime’s 
immediate pre-election needs. By contrast, international coverage mobilised Russia’s 
international cultural capital. We draw broad conclusions about how neo-authoritarian 
regimes navigate mediated memory of the past for legitimation purposes.  
Introducing Russia’s idiosyncratic regime of commemoration 
Contemporary neo-authoritarian political elites frequently articulate political programmes 
which promise increased economic prosperity and security, whilst simultaneously 
disseminating ideational-identitarian narratives concerning the nature of the state, its 
people, and place in the world, that justify the erosion of democratic institutions and 
rights (Kneuer 2017). When their capacity to deliver on such promises is under threat, 
ideational legitimacy-building increases (Zhao, 2016). In her comparative study of 
current neo-authoritarian regimes from China to Venezuela, Kneuer (2017) argues that 
their legitimatory constructs constantly adapt to changing internal and external 
conditions. The political leadership in such systems does not tend to pursue long-term 
objectives, so the narratives that they employ have to be flexible and modular. As a 
result, despite some minimal stability of core structural narrative components, 
accompanying elements fluctuate depending upon context and upon the leadership’s 
changing goals.  
In the Russian case, the 'colour revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine saw the emergence of 
a crucial ideational-identitarian narrative of revolution as a foreign policy tool of ‘the 
West’, assisted by treasonous pro-Western elites (Putin, 2014). According to this account, 
only a strong state with a strong leader can protect citizens from the inevitably destructive 
consequences of such interventions. However, the 2008-9 economic recession and 2011 
anti-government protests showed the limitations of legitimation based on Putin’s strong 
state. During Putin’s third term, the reliance on identitarian narratives has 
correspondingly increased, framed in terms of the government securing the country from 
a range of domestic and external ‘enemies’ that is frequently narratively updated (Teper, 
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2018). The result is an oscillating vision of Russia, replete with contradictions over 
whether Europe, Ukraine and Islam form part of the Russian ‘self’ or ‘others’. The 
‘West’, however, represented in particular by NATO and the United States, is a constant 
other (Teper, 2018). These contradictory representations are periodically slotted into state 
narrative as required by the changing domestic and international goals of the regime 
(Tolz and Teper 2018). This changeable picture suggests not an attempt to delineate a 
contemporary Russian national identity or to foster collective solidarity, but to selectively 
address popular concerns as expressed in opinion polls, and thereby neutralise 
oppositional challenges to official discourse.  
Within this strategy of legitimation, narratives about the past are used purely to buttress 
the oft fluctuating ideational-identitarian narrative, which is entirely about the immediate 
present. This means that selectively evoked historical events do not have to come 
together into the coherent vision of national history necessary for nation-building. Just as 
the regime-sponsored ideational-identitarian narrative itself is situational, so are the 
interpretations of historical events to which it refers. So, whilst the anniversary of the 
Second World War in 2005 saw Stalin's Soviet Union represented as a victorious state 
under strong leadership (Torbakov, 2011), by the revolutions’ centenary, the strong state 
was late tsarist Russia. Tsar Nicholas II 'never forgot his personal responsibility before 
the country' (Channel 1, The True History of the Russian Revolution), whilst Stalin was 
merely ‘a bandit’ and ‘murderer’ (Channel 1, Trotsky).  
Clearly, then, national memory as a particular interpretative frame is not static and does 
not exist in isolation but is discursively produced within ‘historically specific and 
contestable systems of knowledge and power’ – or, ‘regimes of memory’ (Radstone and 
Hodgkin, 2003: 11). The specifics of any regime of memory reveal ‘a politics of memory 
discourses’ (Radstone and Hodgkin, 2003: 2), as demonstrated by the narrative and 
commemorative fluctuations that often accompany changes in political leadership. 
Political scientists have further examined political actors’ contrasting memory strategies, 
typologising the ‘official memory regime’ of various states in East-Central Europe 
(Bernhard and Kubik, 2014: 10). They identify three main models of public 
commemoration: the 'pillarized memory regime' of democratic and broadly pluralist 
historical interpretation; the ‘unified’ model of broad consensus about the past among key 
mnemonic actors; and the 'fractured' regime where opposing political actors mobilise 
conflicting interpretations of historical events for electoral gains (Bernhard and Kubik, 
2014: 15-16). None of these typologies, however, fit a neo-authoritarian context, where 
dramatic and unexpected narrative fluctuations can occur without a transfer of power – in 
China, for instance, key figures and historical events have been recently drastically re-
imagined to suit the immediate needs of the incumbent political elite (Bernstein 2015; 
Jing 2017). Similarly, in Russia, conflicting interpretations of the revolution are promoted 
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by the same political leadership and its closely-affiliated political actors in a process 
which is, at least partially, state-managed. 
In order to conceptualise such intra-regime contestation within this Russian model of 
state-sponsored commemoration, we draw on two notions from memory and media 
studies, both of which foreground the interaction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ media. One is 
Hoskins’ concept of the ‘memory of the multitude,’ which accounts for how online and 
social media allow people to engage in commemoration via ‘new flexible community 
types with emergent and mutable temporal and spatial coordinates’ (Hoskins 2017: 85). 
Unlike the collective notion of national memory, the ‘memory of the multitude’ 
foregrounds the fragmentation and speed of change that the contemporary media ecology 
implies for historical memory landscapes. This ‘multitude’ could prove challenging for a 
neo-authoritarian government, and in the case of World War II, Russian political elites 
responded by co-opting popular grassroots narratives into official discourse (Bernstein, 
2016: 433). Situating this co-optation process within the context of a challenging global 
media ecology, we characterize intra-regime historical contestation as one means by 
which political elites and state-affiliated actors attempt to impose order on chaotic social 
media dynamics by engaging new communication technologies to promote hegemonic 
narratives and frames. These tactics for navigating memory are similar to the attempts of 
mainstream media to ‘arrest’ chaotic information flows during war and conflict (Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin, 2015). State-affiliated actors attempt to harness the complexity of the 
current media ecology to the regime’s advantage, by ‘arresting’ genuine contestation of 
history-related narratives. This produces a specific model of state-endorsed 
commemorations, reflecting new ways of instrumentalising the past. Whilst the strategy 
of ‘arresting’ is by no means always successful, its potential is highest when events are 
far from living memory and produce weak public sentiment. This proved to be precisely 
the case with the revolutions.  
Different Actors and Competing Narratives of the Revolution 
Russia’s leadership shares a trait with other neo-authoritarian regimes like China in being 
highly sensitive to public opinion (Creemers, 2017; Tsai, 2016), so several respected 
scholars predicted that social dissensus about the legacies of the 1917 revolutions would 
constitute ‘real problem’ for Putin’s government ( Edele, 2017); Fitzpatrick, 2017: 824). 
However, recent polls suggest that the revolutions, unlike the Second World War, do not 
provoke strong popular sentiments. 80% of respondents considered that the February 
Revolution had little long-term significance, or were unable to form a judgement 
(Levada, 2017a), whilst 54% saw no reason to dwell on the legacy of the October 
Revolution (Levada, 2017b).  
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The real issue, then, is that the public players that the state relies upon to maintain its 
legitimacy have opposing positions on the revolutions’ legacies. The relatively positive 
interpretations of the military and the Communist Party conflict with the overwhelmingly 
negative perception of the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the domestic and international 
arenas present different challenges and opportunities for the regime: domestically, the 
repudiation of revolutionary activism is the core element of the state’s ideational-
identitarian narrative, but internationally, popular mythologies surrounding the 
revolutions constitute an unrivalled source of cultural capital.  
Since official discourse must take these opposing perspectives into account at the time of 
the centenary, responsibility for pursuing these conflicting visions with the relevant 
audiences appears, in effect, to have been divided between different information gate-
keepers. These include leading politicians and state-controlled media. Nonetheless, the 
state’s role in managing commemorative processes means that these conflicts cannot 
produce the kind of genuinely fractured memory field as observed in Poland or Hungary 
(Bernhard and Kubik, 2014b; Seleny, 2014). The Russian Orthodox Church closely co-
operates with the state, and only representatives of the 'within system opposition' 
(sistemnaia oppositsia), which performs competition for the regime, can access the most 
influential media. The Kremlin does not orchestrate the entire process, but establishes the 
parameters within which individual players exercise agency in performing their roles. 
Within this managed framework, state-affiliated actors can adopt diverse positions. 
These, however, tend to support a common core message, thus disseminating it more 
effectively to different audiences (Tolz and Harding, 2015). Unfettered by strong public 
opinion, this is precisely the pattern observed in domestic commemoration of the 
revolution’s centenary, which emphasised the dangers of all challengers to an incumbent 
regime. For overseas audiences, the centenary was used to emphasize Russia's relevance 
for the development of social justice within contemporary international society.  
Top politicians offered some diversity of interpretation from the start, and this paralleled 
the multivocal narrative articulation of the 80th anniversary in 1997 (Malinova 2015, 59-
60). Putin and Medinsky used a broad ‘reconciliation and accord’ frame, condemned 
foreign assistance to the revolutionaries, and painted both revolutions as illegal coups. 
However, Medinsky attempted to simultaneously accommodate the Orthodox Church, 
communist opposition and military by balancing his critique with praise for the 
Bolsheviks’ state-building efforts (MGIMO, 2015). Putin, however, derided Lenin's 
attempts to re-build the state, arguing that his policies precipitated the USSR's collapse in 
1991 (Putin, 2016).  
Domestic coverage 
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Such diversity was reflected in domestic broadcasters’ coverage of the first 1917 
revolution in February-March 2017. Different commentators interpreted the revolution 
either as a global phenomenon, which 'determined world developments in the twentieth 
century,' (Channel 1, 2017b) or a tragedy, 'which resulted in numerous victims and threw 
our country back by many decades' (Channel 1, 2017a); either as 'spontaneous popular 
unrest' (Channel 1, 2017c) or a West-sponsored elite conspiracy (Channel 1, 2017d). A 
similar incompatibility was evident on Rossiya-1, as when a March 2017 teaser for a 
forthcoming programme, The Great Russian Revolution, included a series of 
condemnatory statements about the revolutions and revolutionaries by leading dissident 
writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Patriarch Kirill. The conclusion of the network’s 
presenter, top media executive Dmitrii Kiselev, that Lenin was concerned with ‘building, 
rather than destroying’ and ‘made people believe in the reality of a just world…’ clashed 
entirely with what the Patriarch and Solzhenitsyn had said (Rossiya, 2017).  
However, at precisely the same time as these ambiguous outputs were being aired, media 
executives closely aligned with the Kremlin began working on some rapidly-produced 
programming intended for October-November (Shmeleva, 2017). It was at that crucial 
point that both domestic channels aired most of their revolution programming and 
ambiguity gave way to a clear anti-communist stance, repudiating not just the revolution, 
but also its legacy. This amounted to the boldest attempt in post-Soviet Russia to produce 
an unambiguous narrative of terror around the October revolution and its legacy for mass 
consumption. 
Both Channel 1 and Rossiya-1 aired serials which offered a simplistic and coherent 
critical line. Channel 1's Trotsky gave a damning account of Bolshevik treason, cruelty 
and moral depravity. It was produced in record time during 2017, according to a detailed 
brief that the network’s CEO, Konstantin Ernst, had drawn up together with the 
scriptwriter and producer (Shmeleva, 2017). A participant in weekly strategy meetings 
with the presidential administration, Ernst has previously been entrusted with creative 
agency for significant state-sponsored projects. The screenplay of Trotsky portrayed all 
major Bolsheviks very negatively (Gordeeva and Petrashko, 2017: 3). Lenin was depicted 
as no better than murderous Stalin, masterminding with Trotsky the first wave of post-
revolutionary terror and citing Stalin as an example of how one should treat one's 
opponents by subjecting them to maximum suffering (ep.7). Similarly negative portrayals 
were apparent in Demon of the Revolution, a serial that aired on Rossiya-1 from 6 
November. Advertised as a historically-accurate revelation of information that had been 
deliberately 'concealed for the previous hundred years' (Demon, ep.1), the serial painted 
Lenin and his entourage as traitors whose German funding constituted a deciding factor 
in the events of 1917. Though German funding and Western meddling had been 
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referenced in February-March 2017, its reiteration over almost four hours through a 
visually powerful medium gave this narrative a major boost.  
In contrast to previously dominant historical narratives, these serials neither represented 
contemporary Russia as heir to the Soviet state nor offered any positive assessments of 
the Soviet legacy. All the commemorative programmes broadcast by the two main 
domestic channels during October-November, in fact, repudiated this legacy. Demon of 
the Revolution ended with documentary footage from 1917 of Lenin giving anti-war 
speeches. These iconic Soviet-era images acquired a new meaning, however, given the 
preceding account of German stage-management of Lenin’s return to Petrograd in order 
to take Russia out of the war. The film thus extended Putin's earlier interpretation of the 
signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as an act of 'national betrayal' (cited in Tolz, 2014: 
257), depicting Lenin as a mere German agent. The repudiation of the legacy of the 
revolution in Trotsky was even more dramatic, voiced by the philosopher Ivan Ilyin, 
whom Putin often quotes in his speeches. Ilyin proclaims that the future the Bolsheviks 
are building 'has already arrived. It is here, in these stone prison cells… Your revolution 
is a rebellion of bandits and criminals' (ep.8).  
The assessment of the Ilyin character in Trotsky that people are an easily-led mob rather 
than a creative revolutionary force was fully developed in Rossiya-1’s The Great Russian 
Revolution, billed as a research-based documentary. In contrast to its contradictory advert 
in March, this programme had a clear anti-communist message, with revolutionary 
masses depicted as drunken deserters and cocaine users. Most significantly, it used an 
idealised vision of the late imperial period as the source of Russia’s usable past, rather 
than Soviet achievements – unheard of in such an emphatic form for state-sponsored 
narratives. In this account, Russia had the highest industrial growth in the world on the 
eve of WWI; and tsar Nicholas II was a much more effective leader than historians have 
suggested. Channel 1's counterpart, The True History of the Russian Revolution, praised 
late imperial Russia even further, whilst condemning liberal oppositionists and the 
Bolsheviks as traitors, and ridiculing ordinary people as pawns of the elite. Both 
programmes fostered fear of revolutionary developments via explicit links drawn 
between the legacy of 1917, the traumatic state collapse of 1991, and Putin’s alleged 
saving of Russia from another collapse in 1999. 
Despite their claims to factual accuracy, however, domestic programming was ultimately 
'docufiction', which combined 'documentary media with witness interviews and fictional 
re-enactments' (Erll and Rigney, 2009: 4) such that only experts could distinguish 
between a historical source and a fictional invention. Most notably, Demon regularly 
quoted from the memoir of a tsarist intelligence agent as if this were a reliable historical 
source. However, the character and his writings were entirely fictitious. What is more, the 
programming was designed not to be a reflective exploration of national history. Rather, 
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it was premised on entertainment, being advertised as ‘spy games and intrigues, 
deceptions and adventures, betrayals, bribery, [and] political murders’ (Pakshin, 2017).   
The 'sense of obviousness' (plausibility) of the narratives – a necessity for generating 
their public appeal (Topolski, 1999) - was strengthened by co-opting longstanding 
critiques of the Bolsheviks, including direct references to Solzhenitsyn's work in The 
Great Russian Revolution, The True History and Demon. Conspiracy theories of 1920s 
White-movement émigrés were reflected in attention paid to the Jewish origins of 
prominent revolutionaries, the presence of masons within the Provisional Government 
and the foreign funding for revolutionary activities. Finally, the Russian Orthodox 
Church's idealisation of tsar Nicholas II and the late imperial period (contrasted with the 
atheistic liberals who initiated Russia's destruction) prevailed in The Great Russian 
Revolution and The True History. 
International coverage 
Coverage of the centenary for foreign audiences was entirely different. RT’s English-
language output was geared to foster communities of cosmopolitan memory (Beck, Levy 
and Sznaider, 2009) by exploiting Russia’s cultural capital around the romantic aura of 
the revolutions. The low-key broadcast coverage included just one package within RT’s 
Sputnik interview show to mark the February revolution, and in October, a documentary, 
Revolution: 100 Years Young and a themed edition of the CrossTalk panel discussion. 
These programmes echoed messages that had dominated domestic marking of the 
revolution’s anniversary in 1997 (Malinova 2015: 59-60), emphasising the positive social 
legacies of the revolution globally, despite the hardships endured at home. The narratives 
were made more relevant to overseas audiences due to their emotive construction within 
personalised, contemporised and impressionistic coverage – not just in conversation-
based programmes like CrossTalk and Sputnik, but also in the editing together of 
documentary interviewees’ contemporary personal activism within a broadly anti-
capitalist narrative. The programmes’ sense of obviousness came from their echoing of 
Soviet-era and contemporary left-wing anti-capitalist narratives of the inevitability of the 
revolution as a popular uprising; the central importance of Lenin early on in 1917; the 
anti-war, anti-imperialist credentials of the Bolsheviks; and the catastrophic 
consequences of Western intervention in the Russian civil war (RT, 2017c: 08:02). 
RT’s main commemorative output, however, was the multimedia #1917LIVE online 
reenactment of the revolution. Launched in February 2017 and continuing for the rest of 
the year, the project promised to 'cover 1917 in Russia in real time' (RT, 2017a). It did so 
within a range of detailed and frequently-updated English-language resources.5 Like RT’s 
television programmes, these stressed the inevitability of the revolution, in stark contrast 
to the contingency and chance emphasised in the anti-communist domestic coverage. The 
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initiative’s centrepiece was a ‘live tweeting’ project conducted via individual accounts of 
historical figures, including leading Bolsheviks, the tsar and Provisional Government 
members, and 'ordinary' people, based on memoirs, diaries and other historical records. 
RT’s hardback tweet book produced to mark the end of the project lists 39 official 
accounts in the dramatis personae (RT, n.d. pp. 8-13). Members of the public were 
invited to create further accounts as part of the #1917CROWD, and apparently ‘dozens’ 
did so (RT, n.d.: 354). Some tweeted more than the official accounts, and almost 90 
characters contributed to the project at its peak. Furthermore, the project engaged as 
account curators prominent authors of books about relevant personalities - Brazilian 
author, Paulo Coelho (as Mata Hari; 3115 followers) and British historian, Helen 
Rappaport (as the Romanov sisters; 2089 followers). The most popular accounts, 
however, were RT-managed Russian Telegraph/Revolutionary Times (@RT_1917; 57.3k 
followers) and Vladimir Lenin (@VLenin_1917; 19.5K followers).6 
In contrast to domestic coverage, RT’s revolutionary Russia was the source of 
transnational progressive trends. Broadcast output and #1917LIVE (via a ‘chronicle’, 
tweets and an interactive web map) echoed Soviet teleological narratives, portraying 
Lenin and his party as central and significant figures from the start. Lenin’s perspective 
on important events was foregrounded, whilst his complex personal life was avoided. The 
re-enactment was marketed as an educational resource, based on ‘[t]horough historical 
research’ (RT, 2017b) and won international accolades on this basis (Shorty 2017 and 
2018). In fact, #1917LIVE represented an on-line version of 'docufiction', which 
incorporated fictional and semi-fictional characters (e.g. @StudentVlad1917; see 
Morrisey, 1998: 223-224). Quotes from historical sources were often rephrased to better 
relate them to the present, as in Lenin’s declaration that ‘Twitter is not only a collective 
propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer! #LoveTwitter 
#1917LIVE’ (Vlenin, 2017b).7  
By their nature, Twitter reenactments involve some relinquishing of control over 
message, and reflexivity to social media users’ online interactions. This sets #1917LIVE 
apart from other forms of mediated commemoration, including the privately-run Russian-
language Project 1917 to which it bears certain similarities (see Wijermars, 2017: 60). 
Thus, #1917LIVE produced sometimes ambiguous content, open to multiple 
interpretations, such as in the exhortations of RT’s Lenin to dismiss as 'fake news' 
accusations of collusion with the Germans (VLenin_1917, 2017a) – precisely the 
accusations that had dominated the limited domestic references to Lenin’s April 1917 
return to Petrograd. Yet, this relinquishing of control was ultimately partial, with the 
overall Twitter output being dominated by what was produced/re-tweeted by RT’s own 
accounts. This fits with the specific ways Russia and other neo-authoritarian states tend to 
deal with the challenges of information flows and ‘the multitude of memory’ within the 
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global and domestic media ecologies, by entrusting state-affiliated actors to ‘arrest’ the 
potential chaos of on-line and digital communications.8 Despite its interactive ambiguity 
and some polarisation of interpretations, #1917LIVE engaged with messages that were 
also central in the domestic coverage. The main one of these was the explicit criticism of 
the ‘West’, whether this as a funder and fomenter of revolution or as a hypocritical 
hegemonic power (V_lenin1917, 2017a).  
Similarly to the domestic coverage, RT’s output foregrounded entertainment, including 
sex scandals, conspiracies and gossip. The personalisation of RT’s broadcast coverage, 
plus the ‘live’ logic of #1917LIVE, made them relevant to global audiences, and 
interactive with non-project accounts and trends. Reflecting RT’s wider brand identity, 
tweets and broadcast output was often deliberately ironic – as when a millionaire 
communist is described as an ‘extraordinary man’ in Revolution: 100 Years Young, 
alongside footage of him snoozing (19:58). The #1917LIVE project actively incorporated 
multimedia social plug-ins, including Periscope live streaming (RT, 2017e), and virtual 
reality panoramic videos.9 Thus, varied media-consumption preferences and viral 
marketing opportunities were catered for. 
Conclusions: Understanding new uses of the past in a neo-authoritarian state  
Commemoration of the 1917 revolution by Russian state-aligned media varied 
dramatically in its core narratives, themes, editorial approaches and chosen media 
platforms. These differences were evident in comparison to how similar topics have been 
covered before, despite there being no change in political leadership. They were also 
evident in stark contrasts between the outputs intended for domestic and international 
audiences. Thus, the default assumption that state-sponsored narratives of national history 
are geared towards national identity construction does not work in this case. Rather, a 
state’s official memory regime is directly related to its political system. Within Russia’s 
neo-authoritarian system, media commemoration of the revolution’s centenary 
highlighted new ways of instrumentalising the past. Here, ‘contestation’ is expressed by 
politically allied actors in an attempt to manage the challenging information flows of the 
Russian, and global, media ecology. Multiple conflicting and constantly shifting 
interpretations of historical events are co-opted by state-affiliated actors in order to 
‘arrest’ the ‘memory of the multitude’. Yet, at the same time, specific core messages are 
reinforced to legitimise the existing government. 
The centenary of the 1917 revolutions proved an instructive case to observe this new 
instrumentalisation of the past in action with wider implications. First, we concur with 
Kneuer (2017) that neo-authoritarian regimes are most likely to use ill-remembered 
events from the distant past for legitimation purposes. In this case, limited popular 
knowledge and weak popular sentiment offered an ideal opportunity to reinterpret history 
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in ways that were politically expedient for the ruling elite. Here, the negative 
representation of the ‘revolutionary masses’ on state-funded channels Channel 1 and 
Rossiya-1 is particularly salient, given the coincidence of the centenary with the start of 
the 2018 presidential election campaign. It reinforced a core component of the regime's 
preferred ideational-identitarian narrative: the 'non-intrusion pact' between the political 
leadership and society (Petrov et al 2014), by which citizens judge that 'social 
organisation independent of the state… is useless, [and] risky…' and they acquiesce, 
instead, to the status quo.  
Second, the precise contents of the reinterpretations of the revolution and its legacies 
corresponded with the priorities of an election cycle in which the main numerical and 
ideological challenges to Putin were anticipated to come respectively from the 
representatives of the Communist party and the liberal opposition. Thus, the media’s 
unprecedented critique of the main actors and legacies of the October revolution; political 
liberals; and bottom-up social movements (portrayed as being directed by foreign agents) 
clearly fit the immediate political legitimation priorities of the current regime. There is no 
reason to believe that the consistently anti-communist narrative disseminated to the 
domestic audience will remain stable beyond the context of the elections, nor that its 
purpose is the construction of a new, post-Soviet Russian national identity. On the 
contrary, RT's contrasting narrative shows willingness to instrumentalise history as 
cultural capital for international audiences.  
Finally, it was politically-allied actors whose interpretations of history diverged. This 
appears to have resulted from selective stage-management and delegation of 
responsibilities and creative agency, within parameters acceptable to the Kremlin. The 
consequence of the delegation is reflected in the particularities of the different media 
products. Demon of the Revolution displays the same affinity for conspiracy theory and 
tsarist counter-intelligence services as producer Vladimir Khotinenko's 2005 serial The 
Fall of the Empire (Gibel' imperii). The serial’s villains, however, have been updated 
from the Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians relevant during the 'history wars' of the mid-
2000s, to Demon’s Bolsheviks, relevant to 2018’s electoral challenge. By contrast, 
though Channel 1’s Konstantin Ernst devised the Trotsky brief, its producer, Aleksandr 
Kott, offers more sophisticated visual devices, characterisations, and engagement with 
wider social issues than in Demon  – although both serials were criticized for implicit 
anti-Semitism (Krasheninnikov 2017). Similarly, RT’s social media chief at the time, 
sought not just to educate and engage audiences through #1917LIVE, but to set ‘new 
best-in-class Twitter standards’ (RT, 2017f). 
The novel media treatment of the centenary of the Russian Revolution shows the wide 
range of contemporary media tools being used to help justify and perpetuate Russia’s 
present ruling elite, much like in other neo-authoritarian regimes (see also Creemers, 
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2017; Tsai, 2016; Tolz and Teper 2018). This case demonstrates how commemoration 
provides a fertile opportunity for such legitimation by co-opting, and thus ‘arresting’ the 
‘memory of the multitude’. Given this focus on legitimation rather than building national 
identity, neither narrative inconsistency nor the tailoring necessary to reach varied 
audiences poses a problem, and state-funded broadcasters are in a strong position to 
attempt experimental approaches. In this context, historical narratives are flexible, 
modular, and subject to change in accordance with immediate political needs – as are the 
range of formats chosen for their delivery. These mediated narratives constitute tools by 
which neo-authoritarian states seek to confront the challenges that their distinctive media 
systems face within a wider global media environment that is governed by personalised, 
emotive responses to information.   
 
1 A 2018 survey from the respected Levada polling organisation found that 73% of 
respondents used television as their main source of news (Levada, 2018). 
2 These five periods include: the February revolution, the tsar’s abdication and the 
establishment of the Provisional Government (19 February – 3 March); Lenin’s return to 
Petrograd (3 April); The July Days (4-19 July); The ‘Kornilov Affair’ (25-30 August); 
the October Revolution (with the monitoring period from 10 October to the end of 
November). Only periods one and five were covered in the broadcast output. 
3 See www.reframingrussia.com 
4 For a notable exception, see Vlad Strukov and Victor Apryshchenko, eds., Memory and 
Securitization in Contemporary Europe (London: PalgraveMacmillan, 2018). 
5 Russian- and Spanish-language portals were created but quickly abandoned. 
6 All follower numbers accurate at 04 April, 2018 
7 Lenin’s original statement (cited in Kenez, 1985) was that ‘The press should be not only 
a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but also a collective organizer of the 
masses’   
8 For comparison with the situation in China see Zhang 2012. 
9 Full series available to view at https://1917.rt.com/#!/en/video360/all 
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